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A NOTE ON THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT TO CONDEMN
FOR HOUSING
ROBERT G. SEAKS*
The national government's extensive program of slum clearance and home con-
struction to raise housing standards and provide employment must look for constitu-
tional sanction to the so-called "spending power" of Congress. Although the current
period of stress bids fair to enlarge pre-depression concepts of national power, it
seems impossible to sustain the suggested program on any other basis. While federal
authority to regulate interstate commerce has been given an ever-widening scope, it
is difficult to conceive of a re-housing project as a regulation of interstate commerce.
That the spur to industrial activity offered by large federal expenditures would in-
crease the flow of interstate commerce may be economically true, but the subtleties of
constitutional theory would hardly countenance so long a leap. The Supreme Court's
recent refusal to regard economic emergency as a source of power' precludes those
who would urge it to justify extending federal authority. The relation of slum
clearance to other spheres of national power seems unduly remote.
The first of the enumerated powers of Congress reads:2 "The Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." Through-
out early constitutional history two opposing views of the correct limitations on the
power to spend persisted. The Madisonian view (so-called from its most vigorous
proponent) considered that the legitimate field of expenditure was but coextensive
with the granted fields of power. The Hamiltonian view interpreted the provision
to permit expenditure of funds with the sole limitation that it be in promotion of the
general, as distinguished from local, welfarea While the question was early the
subject of recurrent Congressional debate, legislative practice since the Civil War has
tacitly adopted and broadened the Hamiltonian view, and funds have been appro-
priated for such diverse purposes as the relief of localities stricken by floods4 and of
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earthquake sufferers in Japan, 5 the creation of a bureau of home economics6 and
bounties for sugar producers.7 Which view is the constitutionally proper one has
never been determined by the Supreme Court, and in holding in Frothingham v.
Mellon" that a taxpayer has not sufficient interest in federal funds to attack an ex-
penditure, the Supreme Court has raised an obstacle to its ready determination.
Whether continued acquiescence in legislative practice be erected into constitutional
precedent or whether the practice be extra-constitutional and permissible only through
lack of a proper preventive, the conclusion seems warranted that the spending power
of Congress is beyond the range of judicial attack.'
But if the federal government is itself to undertake slum clearance and housing
construction, more than the power to spend money for such purposes is needed. A
prerequisite to comprehensive slum clearance is a free exercise of eminent domain
powers,'0 and whether condemnation for housing and slum clearance is constitu-
tionally permissible to the national government is as yet unanswered. A consideration
of cases sustaining the existence of federal eminent domain suggests two different
limits on its scope-limits which parallel those historically urged with reference to
the spending power. The first view would permit the exercise of eminent domain
with the sole requirement that the land condemned be put to "public use,"' ", while
the second view would limit its exercise to effectuation of the granted powers (with-
out determining whether these include the spending power). Since all cases whefein
the Supreme Court has sustained federal condemnation can be brought within nar-
rower limits of delegated powers other than the spending power,' 2 neither the first
theory nor the broader interpretation of the second theory can be taken as settled.
That the United States had any power of eminent domain over lands under state
jurisdiction was never determined until 1875. The dominant states' rights philosophy
made Congress wary of asserting the existence of powers not specifically conferred
by the Constitution.' 3 A possible, more concrete deterrent was the ambiguous word-
ing of the constitutional authorization to Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation
... over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which
the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other
needful buildings."' 4 Prior state decisions had intimated that the stipulation for the
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consent of the state legislatures was a prerequisite, not only to jurisdictional suprem-
acy, but also to acquisition of mere proprietary ownership. 15 Lands needed in
furtherance of federal functions were secured through state statutes authorizing the
condemnation of lands by the state and their subsequent transfer to federal control10
And this method is still utilized to secure lands for the national government when its
own ability is debatable.17 Should federal condemnation be invalid, states so inclined
could make possible federal slum clearance within their jurisdiction by this indirec-
tion.
These early doubts of the existence of federal- eminent domain powers were ended
by Kohl v. United States' s where authority on the part of the national government to
condemn in a federal court sites for a post office and court house was broadly sus-
tained as "essential to its independent existence and perpetuity .... The right is the
offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty unless denied
to it by its fundamental law." But the Court hastened to explain that the national
government is sovereign only within the sphere of its enumerated powers and
specified the postal and judiciary powers as justification for condemnation. That the
rationale of the Kohl case confined the power of eminent domain to furtherance of
the granted powers is reinforced by the next four opinions-all by Justice Field.19
Thus in United States v. Fox20 it was said obiter: "the United States . .. may ac-
quire and hold real property in the state, whenever such property is needed for the
use of the government in the execution of any of its powers." No departure from
this view is discernible in Boom Co. v. Patterson2' despite a reversion to loose lan-
guage in the dictum that "the right of eminent domain ... appertains to every
independent government. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute
of sovereignty." This language was affirmed and restated in United States v. Jones,2 2
but that Justice Field had no intention of widening the theory of the Kohl case is
apparent from the last of these decisions23 where the phrasing is that the United
States has "the right to take private property for public uses when needed to execute
the powers conferred by the Constitution."
Despite this apparent delimitation of the scope of eminent domain, the question
was regarded as open in Shoemaker v. United States24 where land within the District
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of Columbia was held properly subject to condemnation for a park. The landowner
urged a distinction between federal and state powers to condemn in that the former
"must be limited in its exercise to such objects as fall within the expressed enu-
merated powers conferred by the Constitution." The Court properly replied that it
was not called upon to consider whether the "alleged restriction" existed inasmuch
as Congress is given exclusive power over the seat of government. Returning to
orthodoxy, Chappell v. United States2' sustained compulsory acquisition of a light-
house site, recognizing the existence of the power to condemn "whenever in the
execution of the powers granted to the United States by the Constitution, lands are
needed." In a case28 decided at the same term permitting exercise of eminent do-
main for creation of a national park commemorative of a battlefield, it was said:
"The power to condemn for this purpose need not be plainly and unmistakably de-
duced from any one of the pirticularly specified powers. Any number of these
powers may be grouped together, and an inference from them all may be drawn that
the power claimed has been conferred." By thus blurring the issue and failing to
state from what powers the inference was drawn, the case becomes dubious authority
for any position. While it has been thought by a high authority to approve the exer-
cise of eminent domain in conjunction with the spending power,2 7 it is equally
arguable that the case recognizes the need for referring the exercise of eminent do-
main to at least other granted power. Particular stress on the tendency of the
park to foster patriotism makes it apparent that its most substantial basis was the
war power.
Two lower federal court decisions28 have sustained the federal power to condemn
in aid of reclamation projects, although the federal government is held to have no
general legislative power for this purpose.29  Reliance seems to have been placed
upon its power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting its property.30
Yet it is a long step from such power to the power to take other property in aid of
the development of that owned by the government. It is perhaps significant, there-
fore, that a more recent Supreme Court decision3 l upheld condemnation of private
lands for this purpose without any consideration of the limits of federal power.
=x6oU. S. 499, 16 Sup. Ct. 397 (x896).
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While it is unlikely that, in a case involving condemnation for housing, the ques-
tion of the extent of the federal power would be thus ignored, nevertheless, an un-
critical resort to the often-used but undefined term, "attribute of sovereignty," might
enable the Court to gloss over doubts springing from the limited character of federal
sovereignty, leaving as the only limitation upon federal takings the usual require-
ment that their purpose be "public." If, however, the Court were to seek a link
between the exercise of eminent domain for housing and the powers delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution, then it seems inevitable that it must have
recourse to the spending power.32
As noted above, only under the Hamiltonian view"3 does this power to provide
by taxation for the "general welfare" extend to an activity such as housing which is
unrelated to the other delegated powers. If, however, one may assume the soundness
of that view, then it may be argued that the federal government, in raising funds
and obtaining land for housing under the authority of that power, is acting in its
sovereign capacity and, as such, is entitled to the exercise of eminent domain as the
usual attribute of the sovereign in acquiring property. There would be a certain
anomaly in the recognition of this attribute in aid of other powers only to deny its
exercise in conjunction with that clause which contemplates governmental activity
in the spending of money and the acquisition of property, the very functions which
the eminent domain power is designed to implement. To authorize governmental
spending and at the same time to subject the government to the higgling of the
market and the dictates of property owners is to invite extravagance and waste.
Another argument may be advanced. Since the clause authorizing Congress to
provide for the "general welfare" stipulates the means whereby this is to be accom-
plished, viz. by the levying of taxes and, impliedly, by the expenditure of their pro-
,ceeds, it seems clear that the "necessary and proper" clause 4 cannot be resorted to
in justification of other means of achieving the same end. A contrary conclusion
would undermine the basic principle that the federal government is one of delegated
powers. 5 But no such difficulty impedes the enactment of laws "necessary and
proper" only to the means specified, the levying of taxes. A host of such statutes do in
fact exist 6 May it not then be that laws "necessary and proper" to the companion
' The Court might, it is true, pursue the course followed in the Gettysburg case, supra note 26, and
xefuse to specify the powers from which the justification for eminent domain is to be "deduced." This
might, moreover, be coupled with a suggestive reference to the stimulus which the construction of low-cost
:housing would afford to interstate commerce in the products of the well-nigh stagnant heavy industries.
""Hamiltonian view," as here used, refers to the interpretation of "general welfare" placed upon it
*by Congressional practice and disregards Hamilton's own effort to distinguish "general" from "local"
-welfare. However, even though housing were looked upon as promoting only local welfare, still the
housing movement fostered by the federal government has also a broader purpose, the stimulation of
employment and commerce nationally.
" U. S. CONsr. Art. I, §8, cl. 18.
' If the federal government could enact legislation "necessary and proper" to the end of providing for
the "general welfare," then it might, for example, not only subsidize maternity clinics but penalize failure
io report to them.
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means viz., that of applying the proceeds of such taxes to the acquisition of property,
are equally justifiable as impliedly within the scope of federal authority? If so, then
certainly eminent domain is so intimately related to the process of acquiring property
as to be "necessary and proper" thereto.
Two weaknesses inhere in these arguments. In the first place, the specification
of means whereby Congress may provide for the general welfare may be construed
to exclude, by implication, the use of any coercive means 7 in aid of spending, a
construction which would be wholly consonant with the exercise of eminent domain
in aid of the other delegated powers since the means to be employed for their attain-
ment is left to the discretion of Congress.
The second weakness lies in the fact that the articulation of these arguments by the
Court would compel it not only to choose between the competing views as to the
scope of the spending power but also, whichever view was adopted, to determine
thereafter whether the federal government was acting within the bounds it set, and
thereby involve the Court in litigation which might, perhaps, embarrass the govern-
ment in the conduct of essential activities. This consideration weighed heavily in
the Court's refusal to entertain the taxpayer's suit to enjoin the enforcement of the
federal Maternity Act.8 s But, if the Hamiltonian view were adopted, there would'be
ample justification in policy for denying to a taxpayer the power to question the
propriety of an expenditure while allowing a landowner to raise the same question
in eminent domain proceedings. Not only is his stake in the issue far more sub-
stantial, but the likelihood of embarrassment to the government in the conduct of its
affairs is far less. Eminent domain proceedings have always been subject to the test
of "public use" which seems coextensive with the "general welfare" limitation upon
the spending power.
The arguments which have been advanced in support of federal power to con-
demn for housing are untested in the courts, but they are not in conflict with decided
cases. Moreover, it must be remembered that the entry of the federal government
into the field of low-cost housing is itself without peace-time precedent. If justifica-
tion for this action is to be derived from the Constitution5 its advocates must not
shrink from novel argument.
' Yet certainly the power to spend embraces the power to enforce contracts made in aid thereof and
to restrict the remedies available to persons dealing with the government.
"Frothingham v. Mellon, supra note 8. The Court there remarked: "If one taxpayer may champion
and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute
here under review but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration
requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned. The bare suggestion of such
a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have reached." 262
U. S. at 487, 43 Sup. Ct. at 6or.
